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Abstract:   
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taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed 
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1 Introduction
In an economy with asymmetric information, learning agents understand
that information is conveyed by the price system. Taking account of the
information in the price system, they adjust their decisions accordingly. The
amount of information contained in the price depends on the market structure
as well as the decisions of all the agents. Hence, learning and decision-
making cannot be separated, but are integrated through the price system.
The relationship between the informativeness of the price and the market
outcomes must be studied by taking account of the price system and its
interaction with the learning activity and the decisions of all agents.
This paper studies the informativeness of the price in a perfectly compet-
itive market. To that end, we embed learning in a model in which a perfectly
competitive, representative firm, which has complete information about the
market, sells a good whose quality in unknown to some buyers.1 Demand is
composed of both informed and uninformed buyers. The uninformed buyers
use Bayesian methods to infer information from observing the price. On the
supply side, the representative, price-taking firm produces and sells the good.
The cost of production is assumed to be increasing in quality and quantity.
There is also a demand shock, which is known to the firm but unknown
to buyers, that prevents the market price from being perfectly informative
about quality.
After characterizing the competitive equilibrium, the relationship be-
tween learning and market outcomes is addressed. Information flows and
market outcomes are entwined because the uninformed buyers, who learn
from prices, also participate in trading. In fact, the presence of uninformed
buyers and their learning activity influence the informational content of the
price. There is thus a two-way relation between trading and learning. Not
only does learning from prices has an effect on decisions, but the agents’ de-
cisions impact the market price, thus influencing the informational content
of the price and the learning process.
To study the impact of learning on the competitive outcome, we first
1The assumption of one price-taking firm has no bearing on the results.
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study the effect of the uninformed buyers’ learning activity on demand. Since
the uninformed buyers make decisions on the basis of both prior beliefs and
the price, learning can be decomposed into two effects; a beliefs effect and
a price effect. The beliefs effect reflects the change in behavior due to the
asymmetry of information and the use of prior beliefs. The direction of the
beliefs effect depends only on the bias of the prior beliefs. The price effect
reflects the change in behavior due to updating beliefs. Unlike the beliefs
effect, the sign of price effect depends on the bias of the prior beliefs and the
demand shock.
After discussing the structure of demand in a learning environment, we
study the informativeness of the price in the competitive equilibrium. Al-
though it is the interaction of price-taking agents that determines the infor-
mativeness of the price, we identify two important aspects of the dissemina-
tion of information. First, the information conveyed by the price depends on
the source of information. In our model, there is information present in both
the demand and the supply sides. Specifically, on the demand side, there are
informed buyers whose actions convey information. On the supply side, the
information is due to the dependence of the marginal cost on quality. The
second aspect that affects the information contained in the price-signal is the
technology of the firm. Although a perfectly competitive firm has no control
over prices and thus has no ability to influence directly the amount of in-
formation conveyed by prices, the technology and thus the shape of the cost
function do affect the informativeness of the price. Indeed, in a competitive
equilibrium, the price is equal to the marginal cost and thus the conveyance
of information coming from either demand or supply depends on the func-
tional form of the marginal cost. Hence, the distribution of the price-signal
is defined by the distribution of the marginal cost.
To clarify the interaction of the information and the functional form of the
marginal cost on the informativeness of the price, we split the discussion in
two parts. We first discuss the competitive outcome in the case of horizontal
supply curve, and then in the case of increasing supply curve.
When the marginal cost is constant implying a horizontal supply curve,
the distribution of the price-signal is degenerate. The reason is that the
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marginal cost is independent of output and thus independent of the demand
shock. Hence, the information from the demand side is irrelevant, i.e., it is
not conveyed by the price. In the case of a flat supply curve, two extreme
outcomes are possible. On the one hand, when the constant marginal cost
is independent of quality, the price has no informational content and is thus
uninformative about quality.2 In this case, the uninformed buyers revert to
their prior beliefs. The lack of information in the price implies that there is
no price effect. In other words, learning works only through the beliefs effect.
When prior beliefs are bias upward, learning shifts the demand curve, which
increases quantity.
Next, if the constant marginal cost depends on quality, then the price
is informative and, in fact, it is fully-revealing about quality. That is, the
uninformed buyers discard their prior beliefs and infer quality from observ-
ing the price. Note that the price is fully informative even when there is
no information on the demand side. When the price is perfectly informa-
tive, learning has no effect on the competitive outcome since all buyers are
informed in equilibrium. Indeed, beliefs and price effects work in opposite
direction canceling each other out so that the intersection of demand and
supply is unaffected by learning.
We then turn to the case of increasing supply curve. The dependence of
the marginal cost on quantity implies that the price depends on the demand
shock. Hence, the distribution of the price-signal is non-degenerate. Unless
there are no informed buyers and the marginal cost is independent of quality,
the price is partially informative about quality. Note that, unlike the case
of constant supply, the presence of information on the supply side is not
necessary for the price to be (partially) informative. Indeed, the information
on the demand side is conveyed by the price system even when the supply
side has no information. If there is information in the demand function as
well as the supply function, it is the equilibrium interaction of supply and
demand that determines the informational content of the equilibrium price.
When the price is partially revealing (due to information coming from either
demand or supply), the uninformed buyers use both prior information and
2Note that the price is uninformative even when there are informed buyers.
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the information contained in the price to make decisions. Hence, both the
beliefs and price effects are at work but do not, in general, cancel each other.
In that case, the direction of the learning effect depends on both the bias of
prior beliefs and on the demand shock.
Our work falls in the category of rational expectations models that study
information flows in perfectly competitive markets (Kihlstrom and Mirman,
1975; Grossman, 1976, 1978; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).3 These studies
on price transferring information are in endowment economies, i.e., with
a vertical supply curve. We study the relationship between learning and
market outcomes in a production economy. We make explicit the effect of the
supply curve on the dissemination of information.4 Even though the perfectly
competitive firm does not set the price, its decisions affect information flows
through the equilibrium.5 For instance, in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the
price is uninformative when there are no informed buyers. In our case, the
price remains informative in the absence of informed buyers as long as the
marginal cost depends on quality.6
Other studies consider the issue of information aggregation in large mar-
kets, i.e., with a continuum of firms. The firms have incomplete information
and each receives a private signal about demand prior to setting quantity.
This literature studies whether the market price aggregates the information
efficiently. See Vives (1988) for instance. We consider price transferring in-
formation from informed to uninformed agents, i.e., there are learning agents
who update beliefs upon observing the price. In their models, agents do not
use the price to update beliefs, i.e., there is no learning.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
equilibrium. Section 3 discusses how the uninformed buyers’ learning activ-
3See also Grossman (1989) for a general treatment of this literature.
4Our demand setup is similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), i.e., there are informed
and uninformed buyers. As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the market is noisy.
5Judd and Riordan (1994) and Mirman et al. (2014) study information flows in a noisy
monopoly environment.
6Note that the relationship between the informativeness of the price and production has
been studied in the context of insider trading. Indeed, Jain and Mirman (2000) explicitly
links real and financial sectors through insider trading and studies the informativeness of
the financial price when the insider is able to manipulate both real and financial prices.
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ity influences demand. Section 4 derives and characterizes the competitive
equilibrium. Section 5 provides final remarks.
2 Model
We embed learning in a model in which a perfectly competitive firm sells a
good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. We first present the model.
We then define the competitive equilibrium in which the price transmits
information about quality to the uninformed buyers. In the next sections,
we discuss how the uninformed buyers’ learning activity influences demand.
We finally derive and characterize the competitive equilibrium beginning
with the case of constant marginal cost, followed by the case of increasing
marginal cost.
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a market for a good of quality θ ≥ 0 sold at price P ≥ 0. The
demand side is composed of informed and uninformed price-taking buyers.
Informed buyers know θ and have demand QId = θ − P . Uninformed buy-
ers do not know θ, and infer information about quality from observing the
price. Given prior beliefs ξ and the price-signal P , the uninformed buyers
use Bayes’ rule to form posterior beliefs ξˆ(·|P ).7 That is, given a distribution
of the price-signal conditional on any quality θ denoted as φP (P |θ), posterior
beliefs are ξˆ(θ|P ) ∝ ξ(θ)φP (P |θ). Hence, uninformed buyers have demand
QUd = µˆθ(P ) − P where µˆθ(P ) ≡
∫
x≥0
xξˆ(x|P )dx is the posterior mean of
quality upon observing P .8 The posterior mean µˆθ(P ) is also referred to as
the updating rule, which combines prior information and information con-
tained in the price-signal. Note that posterior beliefs influence demand only
through the posterior mean. The updating rule plays a role in determining
the influence of learning on the competitive equilibrium.
7That is, for any X ⊂ R+, the uninformed buyer’s prior and posterior probabilities
that θ ∈ X are
∫
x∈X
ξ(x)dx and
∫
x∈X
ξˆ(x|P )dx, respectively.
8Note that x is used as a dummy variable for quality.
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Normalizing the mass of buyers to one and letting λ ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction
of informed buyers, the market demand is Qd = λQ
I
d + (1− λ)Q
U
d + ε or
Qd = λ(θ − P ) + (1− λ)(µˆθ(P )− P ) + ε (1)
where ε is a demand shock (e.g., noisy buyers), which is unknown to the
buyers. We assume that ε is a realization of the random variable ε˜ with
p.d.f. φε(ε).
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On the supply side, a representative, perfectly competitive firm sells Q
units of the good at total cost C(Q, θ) ≥ 0 such that C1(Q, θ), C2(Q, θ) ≥ 0.
The firm has complete information about demand and cost. In particular, θ
and the realization ε are known. The objective of the price-taking firm is to
set quantity so as to maximize profit
pi = PQ− C(Q, θ). (2)
Note that the number of firms is inconsequential for the analysis.
2.2 Equilibrium Definition
We define the competitive equilibrium, which consists of the quantity Q∗, the
market-clearing price P ∗, the p.d.f of the price-signal conditional on θ ≥ 0,
φ∗P (·|θ), and the uninformed buyers’ posterior beliefs about quality upon
observing P ≥ 0, ξˆ∗(·|P ). In terms of notation, x is a dummy variable for
quality and the asterisk sign on a variable denotes the equilibrium value.
Definition 2.1. The tuple
{
Q∗, P ∗, φ∗P (·|θ), ξˆ
∗(·|P )
}
is a competitive equi-
librium if,
1. Given P ∗,
Q∗ = arg max
Q≥0
{P ∗Q− C(Q, θ)} . (3)
9A tilde sign distinguishes a random variable from a realization.
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2. Given Q∗ and ξˆ∗(·|P ), P ∗ clears the market, i.e.,
λ(θ − P ∗) + (1− λ)(µˆ∗θ(P )|P=P ∗ − P
∗) + ε = Q∗ (4)
where µˆ∗θ(P ) ≡
∫
x≥0
xξˆ∗(x|P )dx is the updating rule.
3. The distribution of the price-signal conditional on quality θ ≥ 0, φ∗P (P |θ),
is derived from (4).
4. Given φ∗P (·|θ), posterior beliefs upon observing P are, for θ ≥ 0,
ξˆ∗(θ|P ) ∝ ξ(θ)φ∗P (P |θ) (5)
by Bayes’ rule.
From Statement 1 of the definition of equilibrium, the firm’s conjecture
about the price is correct. Moreover, from Statements 3 and 4, the unin-
formed buyers’ conjecture of the distribution of the price-signal (conditional
on θ) is correct. This correct conjecture is then used to form posterior beliefs.
Finally, the market-clearing price and posterior beliefs are dependent on each
other. On the one hand, the market-clearing condition and the distribution
of the price-signal are influenced by the updating rule (Statements 2 and
3). On the other hand, from Statement 4, in equilibrium, posterior beliefs
depend on the correct conditional distribution of the price-signal.
Although the pair {Q∗, P ∗} is defined by the usual intersection of demand
and supply, learning alters the demand function through the presence of an
updating rule. Moreover, in a learning environment, the informativeness of
the price is linked to the supply function. Indeed, in a competitive equi-
librium, the price is equal to the marginal cost, i.e., P ∗ = C1(Q, θ)|Q=Q∗.
Hence, the functional form of the marginal cost influences the distribution
of the price-signal conditional on quality. To capture the effect of learning
on a competitive equilibrium, we study the effect that an arbitrary updating
rule has on the demand schedule, and then the effect of the marginal cost
function on the informativeness of the price.
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3 Demand and Supply
In this section, we derive demand and supply functions and we study the
effect of an arbitrary updating rule on demand. Although the effect of the
updating rule on demand can be studied in general, we focus on the class
of linear updating rules, i.e., the updating rule is a linear combination of
the prior mean and the price-signal. Formally, µˆθ(P ) = aµθ + bP where
µθ ≡
∫
x≥0
xξ(x)dx is the prior mean and a, b ≥ 0.10 When a = 0, prior
beliefs have no influence on posterior beliefs whereas a > 0 means that the
posterior mean takes account of prior beliefs. The parameter b determines
the extent to which posterior beliefs are influenced by the price-signal. When
b = 0, the price-signal is uninformative and thus has no effect on posterior
beliefs. If b > 0, then the price is considered informative and is incorporated
into posterior beliefs.
Demand. Plugging µˆθ(P ) = aµθ+bP into (1) defines the demand sched-
ule under learning (L) so that the price-quantity pair {PLd , Q
L
d } satisfies
PLd =
λθ + (1− λ)aµθ + ε−QLd
1− (1− λ)b
(6)
when (1 − λ)b 6= 1. From (6), both the y-intercept and the slope of the
learning demand depend on the updating rule through the parameter b. If
(1 − λ)b = 1, then the demand schedule is vertical. That is, for all PLd ≥ 0,
the price-quantity pair {PLd , Q
L
d } satisfies Q
L
d = λθ + (1 − λ)aµθ + ε. Note
that the presence of uninformed buyers is necessary for the updating rule to
have an impact on demand. Indeed, from (6), when λ = 1, the parameters
a and b are absent from the demand schedule. In fact, evaluating (6) at
λ = 1 defines the demand schedule under full-information (FI) in which
all buyers are informed. The full-information demand schedule regroups the
10It is pertinent to use the linearity of the updating rule because, in equilibrium, the
updating rule is a linear combination of the prior mean and the price-signal, i.e., µˆ∗θ(P ) =
a∗µθ + b
∗P where the asterisk signs on a and b distinguish equilibrium from arbitrary
updating rules.
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θPd
Qd
Figure 1a: (1 − λ)b 6= 1, a > 0, b > 0
θ
Pd
Qd
Figure 1b: (1 − λ)b = 1, a > 0, b > 0
θ
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Qd
Figure 1c: (1 − λ)b 6= 1, a = 0, b > 0
θ
Pd
Qd
Figure 1d: (1 − λ)b 6= 1, a = 1 > 0, b = 0
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L
Figure 1: Demand Schedule under Arbitrary Linear Updating Rule
price-quantity pairs {PFId , Q
FI
d } such that
PFId = θ + ε−Q
FI
d . (7)
In Figure 1 the learning demand is compared with the full-information
demand for four different values of the parameters a and b. Although arbi-
trary values of a and b are considered, each case depicted in Figure 1 may
occur in equilibrium. In each graph, the solid line is the demand schedule
under learning (L) whereas the dashed line represents the demand schedule
under full-information (FI). In Figure 1a, the condition (1 − λ)b 6= 1 im-
plies that the learning demand is not vertical whereas a > 0, b > 0 ensures
that both prior beliefs and new information influence demand. This case
admits several possibilities in terms of slope and location with respect to the
full-information demand. In Figure 1a, the learning demand is downward-
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sloping and crosses the full-information demand from above because, from (6)
and (7), the parameter values satisfy a > 0, θ/(θ+ ε) < b < 1/(1− λ). How-
ever, for (1 − λ)b 6= 1, a > 0, b > 0, the learning demand is not necessarily
downward-sloping. Indeed, if b > 1/(1 − λ), then an increase in the price
induces an increase in quantity through a higher posterior mean, which out-
weighs the standard negative effect of price on quantity demanded. Next,
when (1 − λ)b = 1, a > 0, b > 0, the learning demand is a vertical line as
depicted in Figure 1b. The last two figures consider two extreme cases of the
updating rule. In Figure 1c, the uninformed buyers’ updating rule ignores
prior information, i.e., a = 0, b > 0. This case also admits several possi-
bilities in terms of slope and position with respect to the full-information
demand. In the case depicted in Figure 1c, the learning demand is below the
full-information demand with a steeper slope because, from (6) and (7), the
parameter values satisfy a = 0, θ/(θ + ε) < b < 1/(1 − λ).11 Finally, Figure
1d depicts the case in which the uninformed buyers do not engage in learn-
ing, i.e., purchases are made solely on the basis of prior beliefs. In this case,
the learning and the full-information demand schedules are parallel. Indeed,
from (6) evaluated at a = 1, b = 0 and (7), learning demand is to the right
of the full-information demand if and only if prior beliefs are biased upward,
i.e., µθ > θ as depicted in Figure 1d. Hence, if prior beliefs are unbiased,
full-information and learning demand coincide.
The difference between learning and full-information demands is due to
two distinct effects. The first is about asymmetry of information and prior
beliefs. In a learning environment, the uninformed buyers use prior beliefs
about quality. When prior beliefs are biased (i.e., µθ 6= θ), learning influences
the competitive equilibrium through prior effect of learning. The second
component is about pure learning, i.e., the uninformed buyers update beliefs
upon observing an informative price-signal. Thus, there is an informational
role for the price through the updating rule. This is the price effect of
11Note that when (1−λ)b = 1, a = 0, b > 0, prior information is ignored and the learning
demand is vertical.
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Figure 2: Demand Decomposition under Arbitrary Linear Updating Rule
learning.12
To decompose the effect of learning into these two components, we con-
sider the intermediate case of a naive (N ) demand schedule in which the
uninformed buyers do not learn, and thus, use only their prior beliefs. The
naive demand schedule is defined by the price-quantity pair {PNd , Q
N
d } such
that
PNd = λθ + (1− λ)µθ + ε−Q
N
d (8)
where the prior mean µθ reflects the absence of updating. Hence, compar-
ing (7) and (8) identifies the beliefs effect of learning whereas comparing (6)
and (8) accounts for the price effect of learning.
Figure 2 provides a decomposition of the learning demand. Specifically,
12See Grossman (1989). In Koulovatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009), the effect of
learning on optimal growth also depends on two components, beliefs and anticipation of
learning.
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Figure 2a highlights the prior effect of learning by depicting full-information
and naive demand schedules when prior beliefs are upward-biased, i.e., µθ >
θ. Changing the composition of demand from informed buyers to a group of
both informed and naive uninformed buyers causes a parallel shift of demand.
From (7) and (8), the full-information demand schedule is to the right (left)
of the naive demand schedule when θ > µθ (θ < µθ). The prior effect is
nil when θ = µθ. Next, Figure 2b shows the price effect of learning by
comparing the naive and the learning demand schedules. Given prior beliefs,
the effect of the uninformed buyers’ learning activity on demand is two-fold
when (1− λ)b 6= 1.13 Indeed, from (6) and (8), the price effect changes both
the slope and the intercept of demand.14 Figure 2c aggregates the prior and
price effects by depicting full-information and learning demands. Finally,
Figure 2d summarizes the information from Figures 2a,b,c by providing all
demand schedules.
Supply. Unlike the demand schedule, the supply schedule is unaltered by
the uninformed buyers’ learning activity. Given that the firm’s cost function
is C(Q, θ), the supply schedule is defined by the quantity-price pair {Ps, Qs}
such that
Ps = C1(Qs, θ). (9)
The supply curve depends on θ when the marginal cost function depends on
θ, i.e., when C12(Qs, θ) > 0.
4 Equilibrium
Having discussed the structure of the demand and the supply functions in a
learning environment, we next characterize the competitive equilibrium and
study the informativeness of the price. The information contained in the
market-clearing price emanates from both the demand side and the supply
side. Specifically, the information from the demand comes from the presence
13For (1− λ)b = 1, the updating component makes the learning demand vertical.
14From (6) and (8), the y-intercept between learning and naive demand curves is different
when λθ + (1 − λ)µθ + ε 6=
λθ+(1−λ)aµθ+ε
1−(1−λ)b .
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of informed buyers who know θ whereas, from (9), the information from the
supply is due to the dependence of the marginal cost function on θ.
The presence of informed buyers or a marginal cost function dependent
on quality (or both) are thus necessary for the price to convey information
about quality. Indeed, if demand is composed only of uninformed buyers (i.e.,
λ = 0) and the marginal cost is independent of quality (i.e., C12(Q, θ) = 0),
then there is no source of information in the market, i.e., the market-clearing
condition defined by (4) is independent of θ.
Remark 4.1. In a competitive equilibrium, if λ = 0 and C12(Q, θ) = 0, then
P ∗ is uninformative about θ.
On the other hand, the presence of informed buyers is not sufficient for
the price to be informative. Indeed, in equilibrium, P ∗ = C1(Q, θ)|Q=Q∗(θ,ε).
Hence, the distribution of the price-signal conditional on θ depends not only
on the information contained in demand and supply, but also on the func-
tional form of the marginal cost. Specifically, the informativeness of the price
depends on the signs of the derivatives of the marginal cost. If C11(Q, θ) = 0,
then the price is independent of output, and so the demand schedule has no
bearing on the equilibrium price. This means that the information incorpo-
rated in the demand is not observable through price. If C12(Q, θ) = 0, then
the supply function is independent of quality and no information from the
supply side is conveyed through the price.
To understand the role played by the shape of the supply function on
the informativeness of the price, we characterize the competitive equilibrium
first in the case of constant supply (i.e., constant marginal cost) and then in
the case of increasing supply (i.e., increasing marginal cost).
4.1 Constant Marginal Cost
Suppose that marginal cost is constant, i.e., C11(Q, θ) = 0. A horizontal
supply curve implies that P ∗ is independent of output, and thus, independent
of the demand shock ε. The distribution of the price-signal conditional on
quality is, therefore, degenerate. It follows that, in the case of constant
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marginal cost, the price is either uninformative or perfectly informative about
quality. Specifically, when C12(Q, θ) = 0, the market-clearing condition yields
an uninformative price. On the other hand, when C12(Q, θ) > 0, the market-
clearing condition yields a price that fully reveals quality. We now examine
each case separately.
Marginal Cost Independent of Quality. When the marginal cost is
constant and independent of quality, i.e., C11(Q, θ) = 0 = C12(Q, θ) = 0,
C1(Q, θ) ≡ κ where κ ≥ 0 is unrelated to θ. Then, P
∗ = κ is uninformative
about θ and the uninformed buyers revert to their prior information, i.e.,
µˆ∗θ(P ) = µθ where µθ ≡
∫
x≥0
xξ(x)dx.15
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the marginal cost is constant (i.e., C11(Q, θ) =
0) such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ κ ≥ 0. Then, in the competitive equilibrium,
1. The firm produces
Q∗ = λθ + (1− λ)µθ + ε− κ (10)
at the price
P ∗ = κ. (11)
2. Posterior beliefs do not depend on P and are equal to prior beliefs, i.e.,
µˆ∗θ(P ) = µθ and σˆ
∗2
θ = σ
2
θ .
Proof. Suppose that C11(Q, θ) = 0 such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ κ ≥ 0. Then,
P ∗ = κ. Since the price-signal is uninformative, posterior beliefs satisfy
µˆ∗θ(P ) = µθ and σˆ
∗2
θ = σ
2
θ . Finally, plugging (11) into (4) yields (10), which
satisfies the firm’s maximization defined in (3).
In the case of marginal cost independent of quality, the absence of infor-
mation on the supply side prevents the price from being informative even
when there is information on the demand side.
15In other words, in equilibrium, the updating rule µˆ∗θ(P ) = a
∗µθ + b
∗P is such that
a∗ = 1 and b∗ = 0.
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0P
Q
C11(Q, θ) = C12(Q, θ) = 0
Full-Information
Demand
θ
Learning Demand
= Naive Demand
L∗ = N ∗FI ∗
Figure 3: Constant Marginal Cost Independent of Quality
Remark 4.3. Suppose that the marginal cost is constant (i.e., C11(Q, θ) = 0)
such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ κ ≥ 0. Then, in a competitive equilibrium, the supply
side contains no information and, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), the information present
on the demand side is not revealed by the price.
Figure 3 provides a depiction of the competitive equilibrium under a con-
stant marginal cost which is independent of quality when prior beliefs are
upward-biased, i.e., µθ > θ. An uninformative price implies that the up-
dating rule is equal to the prior. Hence, the learning and naive demand
schedules coincide since the price effect of learning is absent. Moreover, the
learning demand has the same slope as the full-information demand, i.e.,
learning and full-information demands are parallel. The distance between
learning and full-information demands depends on the bias of the prior be-
liefs through the beliefs effect. In Figure 3, learning demand (and thus naive
demand) is to the right of the full-information demand because µθ > θ.
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With a horizontal supply curve, the equilibrium quantity is defined by
the position of the demand curve. The effect of learning on output is shown
in Figure 3 for the case in which prior beliefs is upward-biased, i.e., µθ > θ.
Remark 4.4 states the effect of learning in the case of a constant marginal
cost independent of quality.
Remark 4.4. Suppose that the marginal cost is constant (i.e., C11(Q, θ) = 0)
such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ κ ≥ 0. Then, in a competitive equilibrium, from (10),
Q∗|λ=1 > Q
∗|λ∈[0,1) ⇐⇒ θ > µθ.
Constant Marginal Cost Dependent of Quality. Next, consider the
case in which the constant marginal cost depends on quality, i.e., C12(Q, θ) >
0. Specifically, let C1(Q, θ) ≡ K(θ) ≥ 0 such that K ′(θ) > 0. Then, P ∗ =
K(θ) is informative about θ, which implies that, in equilibrium, µˆ∗θ(P ) =
K−1(P ).
Proposition 4.5 provides the competitive equilibrium under constant marginal
cost dependent on quality. Comparing Propositions 4.2 and 4.5 highlights
the influence of the supply function on information flows, through the sign of
C12(Q, θ). Specifically, when C12(Q, θ) = 0, µˆθ(P
∗) = µθ whereas C12(Q, θ) >
0 implies that µˆθ(P
∗) = θ.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that the marginal cost is constant (i.e., C11(Q, θ) =
0) such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ K(θ) ≥ 0, K ′(θ) > 0. Then, in the competitive equi-
librium,
1. The firm produces
Q∗ = θ + ε−K(θ) (12)
at the price
P ∗ = K(θ). (13)
2. Posterior beliefs are such that µˆ∗θ(P ) = K
−1(P ) and σˆ∗2θ = 0.
Proof. Suppose that C11(Q, θ) = 0 such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ K(θ) ≥ 0, K ′(θ) >
0. Then, P ∗ = K(θ). Since the price-signal is perfectly informative, posterior
beliefs satisfy µˆ∗θ(P ) = K
−1(P ) and σˆ∗2θ = 0. Finally, plugging (13) into (4)
yields (12), which satisfies the firm’s maximization defined in (3).
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Figure 4: Constant Marginal Cost Dependent on Quality
In the case of a constant marginal cost dependent on quality, the price is
fully-revealing regardless of the information contained in the demand side.
Remark 4.6. Suppose that the marginal cost is constant (i.e., C11(Q, θ) = 0)
such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ K(θ) ≥ 0, K ′(θ) > 0. Then, in a competitive equilib-
rium, the price conveys perfect information about quality even when there is
no information present on the demand side (i.e., λ = 0).
Figure 4 provides a general depiction of the competitive equilibrium un-
der a constant marginal cost dependent on quality when prior beliefs are
upward-biased, i.e., µθ > θ. A perfectly informative price implies that prior
beliefs have no effect on the updating rule. Moreover, the uninformed buy-
ers become informed upon observing the price so that the learning demand
crosses the full-information demand at the intersection with supply. Since
the price effect of learning is present, full-information and learning demands
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have different slopes. Moreover, the prior effect and the price effect work in
opposite directions in equal strength. Specifically, in Figure 4, µθ > θ implies
that the naive demand is to the right of the full-information demand, but
since there is full-revelation, the price effect works in the opposite direction
so that learning demand shifts back to cross the supply curve at the full-
information point of intersection. Comparing Remark 4.7 with Remark 4.4
highlights the influence the shape of the supply curve has on the effect of
learning for equilibrium quantity.
Remark 4.7. Suppose that the marginal cost is constant (i.e., C11(Q, θ) = 0)
such that C1(Q, θ) ≡ K(θ) ≥ 0, K ′(θ) > 0. Then, in a competitive equilib-
rium, from (12), Q∗|λ=1 = Q∗|λ∈[0,1).
4.2 Increasing Marginal Cost
In this section, we consider the case of increasing marginal cost. Unlike
the constant marginal cost case, both sources of information (demand and
supply) influence the learning process and the price conveys imperfect or
perfect information about quality.
To study learning with an increasing marginal cost, we rely on the fact
that the family of normal distributions with an unknown mean is a conjugate
family for samples from a normal distribution.16 We also assume that the
cost function is quadratic. Assumptions 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 yield closed-form
equilibrium values, which allows us to gain insight on information flows in a
noisy environment.17
Assumption 4.8. Cost is C(Q, θ) = γθθQ + γQQ
2/2 where γθ ∈ [0, 1) and
γQ ≥ 0.
16For the case of constant marginal cost, there is no need to make distributional as-
sumptions about prior beliefs and the demand shock.
17See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985), Judd and Riordan (1994), and Mirman
et al. (2014) for the use of normal distributions to study the informational role of prices
in endowment and single-agent (e.g., monopoly) problems. See also Vives (2011) for the
use of normal distribution in a rational expectations environment with supply function
competition. Although price and quantity can be negative, restrictions on parameter
values ensures that the probability of a negative price or a negative quantity be arbitrarily
close to zero.
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Assumption 4.9. The distribution of the demand shock is ε˜ ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
where σ2ε > 0.
Assumption 4.10. Prior beliefs about quality are θ˜ ∼ N(µθ, σ2θ) where µθ >
0 and σ2θ > 0.
Proposition 4.11 characterizes the competitive equilibrium for the case of
an increasing marginal cost. Note that in equilibrium the updating rule is a
linear combination of the prior mean and the price-signal.
Proposition 4.11. Suppose that Assumptions 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 hold. Then,
there exists a unique linear competitive equilibrium. In equilibrium,
1. The firm produces
Q∗ =
(1− γθ)θ + ε
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γQ
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
(14)
at the price
P ∗ =
(γθ + γQ)θ + γQε
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γ2Q
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ2ε + (γθ + λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
.
(15)
2. The price-signal conditional on θ is distributed as P˜ ∗|θ ∼ N(µˆ∗P (θ), σˆ
∗2
P )
where
µ∗P (θ) =
(γθ + γQ)θ
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γ2Q
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ2ε
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
, (16)
σ∗2P =
γQσ
2
ε
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γ2Q
1 + γQ
(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θσ
2
ε
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
. (17)
3. Posterior beliefs ξˆ∗(·|P ) conditional on P are normally distributed with
posterior mean µˆ∗θ(P ) = a
∗µθ + b
∗P ,
a∗ =
γ2Qσ
2
ε
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + γQ)(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θ
, (18)
b∗ =
(1 + γQ)(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + γQ)(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θ
. (19)
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and posterior variance
σˆ∗2θ =
γ2Qσ
2
εσ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
. (20)
Proof. Suppose that γQ > 0. Using Assumption 4.8, given P
∗, the first-order
condition corresponding to (3) yields
Q∗ =
P ∗ − γθθ
γQ
. (21)
Plugging (21) and the posterior mean µˆ∗θ(P ) =
∫
R
xξˆ∗(x|P )dx = a∗ + b∗P
into (4) and solving for the market-clearing price yields
P ∗ =
(γθ + λγQ)θ + γQ(1− λ)a∗ + γQε
1 + γQ(1− b∗(1− λ))
(22)
where it remains to solve for a∗ and b∗. From (22) and Assumption 4.9, the
price-signal conditional on θ is normally distributed with mean and variance
µˆ∗P (θ) =
(γθ + λγQ)θ + γQ(1− λ)a∗
1 + γQ(1− b∗(1− λ))
(23)
σˆ∗2P =
γ2Qσ
2
ε
(1 + γQ(1− b∗(1− λ)))2
. (24)
Given that prior beliefs are normally distributed (Assumption 4.10) and
that the price-signal is normally distributed,18 posterior beliefs conditional
on P are normally distributed with mean
µˆ∗θ(P ) =
σ2εγ
2
Qµθ − σ
2
θ(γθ + λγQ)(1− λ)a
∗
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
+
σ2θ(1 + γQ(1− b
∗(1− λ)))(γθ + λγQ)
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
P (25)
18Using (22), let z =
(1−γQ(1−b
∗(1−λ)))P−γQ(1−λ)a
∗
γθ+λγQ
= θ +
γQε
γθ+λγQ
such that z˜|θ ∼
N
(
θ,
γ2Qσ
2
ε
(γθ+λγQ)2
)
. Hence, θ˜|z ∼ N

σ2θz+ γ2Qσ2ε(γθ+λγQ)2 µθ
σ2
θ
+
γ2
Q
σ2ε
(γθ+λγQ)
2
,
γ2Qσ
2
θσ
2
ε
γ2
Q
σ2ε+σ
2
θ
(γθ+λγQ)2

.
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and variance given by (20). It remains to determine the values of a∗ and b∗.
Equating (25) to the conjecture µˆ∗θ(P ) = a
∗ + b∗P and solving for a∗ and b∗
yields (18) and (19). Finally, plugging (18) and (19) into (21), (22), (23),
and (24), and rearranging yields (14), (15), (16), and (17), respectively.
Having characterized the competitive equilibrium when the supply curve
is upward-sloping, we study the informativeness of the price. We begin by
showing that in the case of an increasing marginal cost, the market-clearing
price corresponding to an arbitrary linear updating rule depends on both
demand and supply parameters. Unlike the case of a constant marginal
cost, an increasing marginal cost makes the market-clearing price dependent
on the demand side and in particular, the fraction of informed buyers, the
uninformed buyers’s updating rule, and the demand shock.
Formally, given P and using (3), Q∗ = P−γθθ
γQ
. Plugging µˆθ(P ) = aµθ+bP
and Q = P−γθθ
γQ
into (4) yields
λ(θ − P ) + (1− λ)(aµθ + bP − P ) + ε =
P − γθθ
γQ
(26)
so that the market-clearing price is
P =
(γθ + λγQ)θ + (1− λ)γQaµθ + γQε
1 + γQ(1− (1− λ)b)
. (27)
Expression (27) implies that, unlike the case of constant marginal cost, the
information from the demand side is reflected in the market clearing price
through the parameter λ. In addition, an increasing marginal cost links
the price to the demand shock, which implies that the distribution of the
price-signal is non-degenerate.19 Hence, the price is either uninformative or
imperfectly informative, but never perfectly informative about quality.
Propositions 4.12 and 4.13 provide conditions for which the price reveals
19When demand is noiseless, the distribution of the price-signal is degenerate (as in
the case of constant marginal constant is constant) and fully-revealing about quality.
Evaluating (15) at σ2ε = ε = 0 yields P
∗|σ2ε=ε=0 = (γθ+γQ)θ/(1+γQ), which is independent
of ε and strictly increasing in θ. Hence, plugging (15), (18), (19) evaluated at σ2ε = 0, ε = 0
into µˆ∗θ(P ) = a
∗ + b∗P yields µˆ∗θ(P
∗) = θ.
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either no information or some information about quality. Specifically, unless
there are some informed buyers or the cost depends on quality, the price
cannot provide any information to the uninformed buyers. Proposition 4.12
is consistent with Remark 4.1.
Proposition 4.12. Suppose that γQ > 0. If λ = 0 and γθ = 0, then, in
the competitive equilibrium, P ∗ is independent of θ and µˆ∗θ(P
∗) = µθ and
σˆ∗2θ = σ
2
θ .
Proof. Evaluating (15) at λ = 0 and γθ = 0 implies that the price is inde-
pendent of θ, which yields non-revelation.
Proposition 4.13 states that the price is imperfectly informative as long
as λ and γθ are not simultaneously zero. Although quality is not fully re-
vealed, the posterior variance is less than the prior variance. Here, E is the
expectation operator with respect to the p.d.f. φ∗P (·|θ).
Proposition 4.13. Suppose that γQ > 0. If either λ ∈ (0, 1) or γθ > 0,
then, in the competitive equilibrium,
1. Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗) = αµθ + (1− α)θ where
α =
γ2Qσ
2
ε
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
. (28)
2. σˆ∗2θ < σ
2
θ .
Proof. Plugging (15), (18), and (19) into µˆ∗θ(P ) = a
∗ + b∗P ∗ and taking the
expectation with respect to P˜ ∗ yields
Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗) =
γ2Qσ
2
εµθ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + γQ)(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θ
+
(1 + γQ)(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + γQ)(γθ + λγQ)σ
2
θ
·
(
(γθ + γQ)θ
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γ2Q
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ2ε
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
)
. (29)
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Rearranging (29) yields Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗) = αµθ+(1−α)θ where α is defined by (28).
Next, from (20), the posterior variance is smaller that the prior variance, i.e.,
σˆ2θ =
σ2εσ
2
θγ
2
Q
σ2εγ
2
Q + σ
2
θ(γθ + λγQ)
2
=
1
1 +
σ2
θ
(γθ+λγQ)2
σ2εγ
2
Q
σ2θ < σ
2
θ . (30)
Note that when the price is informative about quality, the information
contained in the price comes from both demand and supply. In particular, if
cost is unrelated to quality (i.e., γθ = 0), learning still occurs because infor-
mation about quality is conveyed through demand when there are informed
buyers (i.e., λ ∈ (0, 1]). The parameter λ controls the amount of information
released by the demand side. An increase in the number of informed buyers
reveals more information. That is, the expected posterior mean is closer to
the value of quality and the posterior variance is decreased as a result of an
increase in the fraction of informed buyers.
Proposition 4.14. Suppose that γQ > 0. Then, in a competitive equilibrium,
∂Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗)
∂λ
> 0⇐⇒ θ > µθ (31)
and
∂σˆ∗2θ
∂λ
< 0. (32)
Proof. From Proposition 4.13,
∂Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗)
∂α
= (µθ − θ) < 0⇐⇒ θ > µθ, (33)
and from (28),
∂α
∂λ
< 0. (34)
The signs of (33) and (34) imply (31). Taking the derivative of (20) with
respect to λ yields (32).
On the supply side, the marginal effect of quality on cost, γθ, governs the
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amount of information emanating from the supply side. Indeed, an increase
in cost through γθ provides more information to the uninformed buyers.
Proposition 4.15. Suppose that γQ > 0. Then, in a competitive equilibrium,
∂Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗)
∂γθ
> 0⇐⇒ θ > µθ (35)
and
∂σˆ∗2θ
∂γθ
< 0. (36)
Proof. From Proposition 4.13,
∂Eµˆ∗θ(P˜
∗)
∂α
= (µθ − θ) < 0⇐⇒ θ > µθ, (37)
and from (28),
∂α
∂γθ
< 0. (38)
The signs of (37) and (38) imply (35). Taking the derivative of (20) with
respect to γθ yields (36).
Having studied the informativeness of the price with an increasing marginal
cost, we next turn to the effect of learning on quantity and price. As noted,
the effect of learning on output and price is reflected in the difference between
the full-information case (i.e., λ = 1) and the learning case (i.e., λ ∈ (0, 1)).
From (14) and (15), the firm produces
Q∗ =
(1− γθ)θ + ε
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γQ
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ2ε + (γθ + λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Learning Effect
(39)
at the market-clearing price
P ∗ =
(γθ + γQ)θ + γQε
1 + γQ
+
(1− λ)γ2Q
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ2ε + (γθ + λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Learning Effect
. (40)
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To highlight the effect of learning, expressions (39) and (40) are decom-
posed into two terms. The first term in each expression is the equilibrium
value when all buyers are informed. If λ = 1, then all buyers are informed
and there is no learning activity, which reduces the second terms in (39)
and (40) to zero.20 The second term represents the effect of learning due to
the presence of uninformed buyers in the market.
Proposition 4.16 states that the sign of the learning effect term depends
on the parameter values, i.e., fraction of informed buyers, demand shock,
bias in prior beliefs, and cost parameters.
Proposition 4.16. Suppose that σ2ε > 0 and γQ > 0. Then, from (39)
and (40),
Q∗|λ=1 > Q∗|λ∈[0,1)
P ∗|λ=1 > P
∗|λ∈[0,1)
⇐⇒ θ − µθ >
(γθ + λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γQσ2ε
. (41)
Proposition 4.16 is in contrast to Remark 4.4. That is, in the case of a
positive constant marginal cost, the prior bias governs the direction of the
effect of learning on output. With an increasing supply curve, the prior bias
has only a partial influence. The reason is that with an increasing marginal
cost, both the beliefs effect and the price effect are present and do not cancel
each other. If prior beliefs are unbiased and the demand shock is positive
(negative), then learning increases (decreases) both quantity and price. How-
ever, if prior beliefs are downward-biased (i.e., θ > µθ) and demand shock is
negative, learning unambiguously increases both quantity and price. Figure
5 depicts the competitive equilibrium with an upward-sloping supply curve
when θ − µθ >
(γθ+λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γQσ2ε
.
The learning-effect term identified in (39) and (40) includes both the be-
20As noted, the presence of uninformed buyers (i.e., λ ∈ [0, 1)) is not a sufficient condi-
tion for learning to have an effect on the competitive equilibrium. Indeed, for all λ ∈ [0, 1),
the learning effect terms in (39) and (40) are equal to zero when demand is noiseless
(σ2ε = 0 so that ε˜ is a degenerate random variable at ε = 0) or marginal cost is constant
(γQ = 0). The reason is that a noiseless demand or a constant marginal cost implies
that the price-signal is strictly increasing in quality and does not depend on the demand
shock. Hence, quality is perfectly inferred from observing the price. It follows that the
competitive equilibrium is unaffected by learning when θ is fully revealed.
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Figure 5: Increasing Marginal Cost Dependent on Quality
liefs effect and the price effect. The price effect reflects the pure informational
role of the price on the equilibrium. In Figure 5, the beliefs effect is the dif-
ference between the equilibrium points FI∗ and N ∗ whereas the price effect
is the difference between the equilibrium points N ∗ and L∗. That is, for the
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price, the learning-effect term in (40) is decomposed as
(1− λ)γ2Q
1 + γQ
(µθ − θ)γQσ2ε + (γθ + λγQ)εσ
2
θ
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Learning Effect
=
(1− λ)γQ(µθ − θ)
1 + γQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Beliefs Effect of Learning
+
(1− λ)(γθ + λγQ)γQσ2θ ((γθ + λγQ)(θ − µθ) + γQε)
(1 + γQ)
(
γ2Qσ
2
ε + (γθ + λγQ)
2σ2θ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price Effect of Learning
. (42)
From (42), the sign of the beliefs effect of learning depends only on the bias
of the prior whereas the sign of the price effect depends on the bias of the
prior as well as the demand shock. Hence, the noise in demand influences
the learning effect only when the price is informative.
5 Final Remarks
In our model, the firm is assumed to be risk-neutral. Moreover, our demand
specification does not make explicit the role played by the buyers’ risk aver-
sion on the competitive equilibrium. Little is known about the role of risk
aversion in an environment in which agents face uncertainty, but engage in
learning. For instance, the behavior of risk-averse perfectly competitive firms
maximizing the expected utility of profit has only been studied in models of
uncertainty without learning (Baron, 1970; Sandmo, 1971; Leland, 1972).
Combining learning and risk aversion would further our understanding of
the role risk aversion has not only on decisions and market outcomes, but
also on information flows. Future work should consider how buyers’ and
sellers’ risk preferences influence the conveyance of information through the
equilibrium.
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